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ABSTRACT 
 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the association of auditor-provided non-
audit services and audit firm tenure with earnings management in Malaysian public 
listed firms. Two measurements, namely, discretionary current accruals based on the 
performance-adjusted model developed by Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew (2003) and 
discretionary total accruals based on the modified Jones model (1991), are employed to 
estimate the level of earnings management. Our sample consists of 525 companies for 
financial year 2009. The results suggest that longer audit firm tenure reduces earnings 
management. However, the magnitude of non-audit fees exacerbates earnings 
management. Based on the empirical evidence, any attempt to legislate audit firm 
rotation in Malaysia is unwarranted. Further research is required to move toward a 
policy resolution on the restriction of non-audit services in Malaysia.  
 
Keywords: earnings management, non-audit fees, audit firm tenure, auditor rotation, 
Malaysia  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The opportunistic accruals-based earnings management practice, i.e., the 
deliberate use of aggressive accounting aided by the flexibilities allowed under 
the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), to report accounting 
numbers that reflect the desires of management rather than the economic reality 
is a research area that is receiving critical attention around the world (Dechow, 
Ge, & Schrand, 2010). Managers use their discretion to manage the accounting 
accruals to adjust corporate earnings to a desired outcome for their personal gain, 
such as to enjoy performance-based compensation, avoid penalties for poor 
performance, avoid violating restrictive debt covenants, obtain higher prices from 
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the issuance of new shares or meet financial analysts' expectations (Giroux, 
2004). Although earnings management is regarded as being within the law, 
Hasnan, Abdul Rahman and Mahenthiran (2013) demonstrate that accruals-based 
earnings management by Malaysian firms grew over time to become fraudulent 
financial reporting. Wardani and Kusuma (2012) also demonstrate that accruals-
based earnings management in Malaysia during 2008 was opportunistic and thus 
impairs the quality of financial reporting.            
  
A key player in deterring earnings management in the financial reporting 
process is the firm's independent external auditor. The primary role of the 
external auditor is to form an independent opinion on the management's 
assertions contained in the annual financial statements of the group and the 
company. Shareholders expect auditors to have the competency to discover 
significant discrepancies from the GAAP and the willingness to report these 
discrepancies. There is an enduring debate whether the provision of non-audit 
services (NAS), such as tax planning and other tax advisory services, design or 
implementation of financial IT systems and corporate finance services by the 
incumbent external auditor and long tenured audit firm compromise the auditor's 
independence (Bell, Causholli, & Knechel, 2015; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; Abdul 
Wahab, Gist, & Nik Abdul Majid, 2014; Kwon, Lim, & Simnett, 2014; Casterella 
& Johnston, 2013; Jenkins & Vermeer, 2013; Koh, Rajgopal, & Srinivasan, 
2013; Habib, 2012). Proponents of auditors providing NAS to the companies they 
audit believe that providing such services helps auditors build a deeper 
understanding of the audited company, which furthers the auditor's insight, thus 
leading to higher audit quality. However, the argument against auditors providing 
NAS stems from the belief that auditors will not want to risk the lucrative fees 
they receive from NAS and hence may not raise the questions or challenges that 
are warranted (Ernst & Young, 2013a). In other words, auditor independence, 
objectivity and professional scepticism may be compromised when audit firms 
conduct non-audit work for the same client. 
 
Another long-standing debate is whether audit firm rotation should be 
mandatory (Kwon et al., 2014). Ernst & Young (2013b) opposes mandatory audit 
firm rotation as it is not an effective way to maintain or enhance auditor 
independence, and it has not been proven to enhance audit quality. Ernst & 
Young (2013b) believes other initiatives, such as mandatory audit partner 
rotation, is more effective in strengthening auditor independence without 
compromising audit quality. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012) concurs with the 
view that the costs of mandatory audit firm rotation would outweigh the 
perceived benefits of a required "fresh look" at the financial statements by a new 
audit firm.  
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 From the regulators' perspective, the latest Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (2012) emphasises that the independence of external auditors can be 
impaired by the provision of NAS to the company; the audit committee should 
therefore establish policies governing the circumstances under which contracts 
for the provision of NAS can be entered into and procedures that must be 
followed by the external auditors (Recommendation 5.2). The Bursa Malaysia 
Corporate Governance Guide (2013) reiterates that the audit committee's policies 
in evaluating the independence of external auditors may entail providing a list of 
NAS by external auditors, which are prohibited and a limit on the fee size on 
NAS provided by external auditors, in absolute terms and/or as a percentage of 
audit fee. The Guide states that: 
 
Ideally, non-audit services should not be performed by the 
external auditors of the company unless the fee for those services 
are negligible compared with the audit fees and are not 
specifically prohibited by professional/regulatory bodies. 
(Bursa Malaysia, 2013, p. 65) 
 
 Similar to the US, Malaysia does not have mandatory audit firm rotation 
requirement. Instead, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) has regulated 
that all public listed companies' lead audit partner should be rotated every five 
years. According to Section 290.151 Part I of the MIA By-Laws: 
 
An individual shall not be a key audit partner for more than five 
years. After such time, the individual shall not be a member of 
the engagement team or be a key audit partner for the client for 
two years. During that period, the individual shall not participate 
in the audit of the entity, provide quality control for the 
engagement, consult with the engagement team or the client 
regarding technical or industry specific issues, transactions or 
events or otherwise directly influence the outcome of the 
engagement. 
(Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2011, pp. 82–83) 
 
However, in Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance Decree 
No:17/PMK.01/2008 mandates a three-year rotation for audit partners and a six-
year rotation for firms (The World Bank, 2010). The Indian Companies Act, 
which became law on 30 August 2013, also requires mandatory audit firm 
rotation every 10 years. Argentina recently introduced a three-year mandatory 
firm rotation (Ernst & Young, 2014). Other countries that have implemented 
mandatory audit firm rotation on listed companies include Brazil, Italy, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey (Chartered Accountants of Canada, 2012), South Korea and 
Spain (Kwon et al., 2014). Given the conflicting views on the efficacy of 
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restricting the provision of NAS and mandatory audit firm rotation, it remains an 
empirical issue whether the provision of NAS and audit firm tenure have any 
effects on financial reporting quality.  
 
This study employs 525 observations for the year 2009. We provide 
some evidence that the magnitude of NAS fees exacerbates earnings 
management, and longer audit firm tenure mitigates earnings management. Our 
study contributes to the literature in the following ways: We contribute to the 
debate surrounding NAS and mandatory audit firm rotation and advance the 
literature on earnings management in Malaysia by showing that the provision of 
NAS by the external auditor and short audit firm tenure erode the financial 
reporting quality. We believe our study can help inform regulators, top 
management and board members, audit practitioners and investors on ways to 
improve audit quality and constrain earnings management.   
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section describes 
the literature review and development of hypotheses, followed by the research 
method and discussion on the results. In the last two sections, we explain the 
additional tests we conduct to ensure the robustness of the findings and highlight 
the policy implications and avenues for future research.  
 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Given the wide incidence of earnings management in Malaysia (Bhattacharya, 
Daouk,  &  Welker, 2003; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Gaio, 2010), there 
exists a number of empirical studies on the determinants of earnings 
management, such as Abdullah and Nasir (2004), Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), 
Aziz, Iskandar and Saleh (2006), Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2005; 2007), 
Bradbury, Mak and Tan (2006), Salleh, Hashim and Mohamad (2012), and Johl, 
Johl, Subramanian and Cooper (2013). The variables they test are related to 
corporate governance mechanisms, which include boards of directors, audit 
committees, internal auditor and external auditor. In the Malaysian context, the 
literature on external auditor and earnings management is largely focused on the 
perceived audit quality differences between the brand name audit firms and other 
audit firms. As mentioned earlier, we extend these studies by investigating the 
association of two potential determinants of auditor's independence, i.e., (1) NAS 
and (2) audit firm tenure, with earnings management.  
 
We focus on the two auditor characteristics as predictors of audit quality 
for several reasons. In Malaysia, external auditors are not prohibited from 
providing NAS, such as management consultancy, tax advice, international 
business advice, professional advice on transactions, for example, mergers, 
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acquisitions or restructuring and human resources consultancy to their auditees 
(Che-Ahmad, Shafie, & Yusof, 2006). This contrasts with the situation in the US, 
where the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) 2002 bans most NAS and requires the audit 
committee to pre-approve the permissible non-audit purchases from the auditor 
(Koh et al., 2013). Although the situation in Malaysia is similar to the UK, 
Australia and New Zealand as far as NAS are concerned (Sharma, Sharma, & 
Ananthanarayanan, 2011), it is interesting to study the effect of non-audit fees on 
earnings management in Malaysia because unlike the countries mentioned above, 
auditor litigation in Malaysia is an extremely rare phenomenon. Consequently, 
the willingness of auditors in Malaysia to take risks may be greater compared 
with more litigious jurisdictions, such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand. 
The rationale for examining audit firm tenure, defined as the number of years an 
audit firm is retained by the client (Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003), is to inform 
regulators whether the current practice of non-rotation of audit firm in Malaysia 
is detrimental to financial reporting quality.  
 
Non-audit Services and Earnings Management   
 
There is an on-going debate whether joint provision of audit and NAS impairs 
independence or generates knowledge spillover. Unlike audit fees that signal the 
expected audit effort, fees for NAS may deliberately include excessive rents to 
increase the financial reliance of the audit firm on the client. The managers then 
opportunistically exploit this economic dependency that succumbs the auditor to 
acquiesce to the client's wishes in financial reporting (Koh et al., 2013). An 
alternative view is that by providing NAS, it endows the auditor with a richer set 
of information about the client, and the auditor exploits this knowledge spillover 
to produce a more effective and efficient audit (Simunic, 1984; Causholli, 
Chambers, & Payne, 2014).  
  
Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) demonstrate that firms purchasing 
more NAS from their auditors report larger absolute discretionary accruals. The 
results of Frankel et al. (2002) are confirmed in subsequent studies by Ferguson, 
Seow and Young (2004), Srinidhi and Gul (2007), and Sharma et al. (2011). 
There are studies that present no relationship between NAS and earnings 
management (Chung & Kallapur, 2003; Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003). 
However, Antle et al. (2006) and Koh et al. (2013) report a significant negative 
relationship. To the best of our knowledge, Abdul Wahab et al. (2014) are the 
only study that examines NAS and financial reporting quality in Malaysia. They 
employ financial restatement as a proxy of financial reporting quality and limit 
their sample to companies that purchase NAS. They find that the level of NAS 
reduces the likelihood of restatements. They conclude that certain types of NAS 
and their recurrence provide knowledge spillover, which enhances audit and 
financial reporting quality. However, whether their result is robust to alternative 
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measurement of financial reporting quality, such as level of abnormal accruals, is 
an open question. Furthermore, their sample is limited to purchasers of NAS. 
Based on the competing theoretical explanations and mixed empirical evidence, 
we make a non-directional hypothesis on the association of NAS with earnings 
management:  
  
H1: There is a relationship between level of discretionary 
accruals and non-audit fees. 
 
Audit Firm Tenure and Earnings Management  
 
There is no consensus on the association between the duration of the audit firm-
client relationship and financial reporting quality. One view states that the audit 
firm's long-run connection with the auditee poses a risk to auditor "independence 
in fact". In other words, long auditor tenure might lead to excessive familiarity 
between the auditor and auditee, which can threaten auditor objectivity, resulting 
in less rigorous audit procedures (European Commission, 2011). Furthermore, 
Carcello and Nagy (2004) argue that there may be atrophy and complacency 
among the long tenured audit teams, such that the audit is undertaken with 
reduced vigour and scepticism. This could lead to poor audit quality and high 
level of earnings management as the auditors are more lenient towards the 
financial reporting of accruals. However, Casterella and Johnston (2013) reiterate 
that over time, recurring audit firms gain valuable knowledge about their clients. 
As the audit firm tenure increases, the auditors  are better at evaluating the risk of 
material misstatements as they gain more experience and better insights into the 
client's operations and business strategies as well as internal controls over 
financial reporting. Thus, a long tenured auditor can minimise manipulations of 
discretionary accruals. In addition, Arrunada and Paz-Ares (1997) posit that 
short-term audit engagement increases audit costs and reduces the auditor's 
technical competence and detailed client knowledge because of a lesser degree of 
specialisation. Thus, under mandatory audit firm rotation, audit costs would 
increase because of the learning curve involved with new clients.  
 
Most prior empirical studies have examined the accounting and auditing 
outcomes of audit firm tenure in a voluntary setting, except for Kwon et al. 
(2014) who examine this issue during the period of mandatory audit firm rotation 
in South Korea from 2006–2010. Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) and 
Carcello and Nagy (2004) find that relative to medium audit firm tenures of four 
to eight years, short audit firm tenures of two to three years are associated with 
lower-quality financial reports. In contrast to the results for short audit firm 
tenures, there is no evidence to suggest that long audit firm-client relationships 
(nine years or longer) are associated with reduced financial-reporting quality 
relative to medium audit firm-client relationships. Similarly, Piot and Janin 
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(2007) and Jackson, Moldrich and Roebuck (2008) fail to provide any evidence 
that long audit firm tenure would lead to an increase in earnings management. 
Chen, Lin and Lin (2008) find that audit tenure is negatively linked to the level of 
discretionary accruals in a sample of Taiwanese companies, consistent with 
Myers et al. (2003). In a unique study that employs a mandatory audit firm 
rotation setting instead of voluntary auditor switching, Kwon et al. (2014) 
provide evidence that the audit quality in South Korea remained unchanged in the 
first year of utilising the new auditor or in subsequent years, which runs counter 
to the intended purpose of the policy. 
 
There are very few studies on audit firm tenure in Malaysia. Shafie et al. 
(2009) demonstrate that a long auditor-client relationship is associated with 
greater likelihood for a financially distressed firm to receive the modified going 
concern audit opinion. Furthermore, Wan-Hussin and Bamahros (2013) indicate 
that long audit firm tenure is associated with shorter audit delay. Echoing 
Stefaniak, Robertson and Houston (2009) and Casterella and Johnston (2013), a 
majority of extant research does not provide evidence to support the mandatory 
audit firm rotation. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
  
H2: There is a negative relationship between the level of 
discretionary accruals and audit firm tenure. 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Estimating Levels of Earnings Management  
 
There are various methods that have been developed by researchers to measure 
discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management. The popular ones in 
the literature are the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1995) models. However, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley (2005) argue that measuring discretionary accruals without 
controlling for firm performance will produce misspecification in the earnings 
management model. In this study, we employ two alternative measures of 
abnormal or discretionary accruals models, namely, discretionary current 
accruals (DCA) based on the performance-adjusted model developed by 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and discretionary total accruals (DTA) based on the 
modified Jones model, without controlling for performance.  
 
The remaining paragraphs in this section describe the estimation of 
discretionary accruals under the two methods. Following the Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003) DCA model, the first step is to calculate total current accruals (TCA). 
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Consistent with recommendations by Kothari et al. (2005) and Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003), TCA is measured as follows:  
 
TCA = EBXI + Depn/Amort – CFO  (1)  
 
where TCA is net income before extraordinary items (EBXI) plus depreciation 
and amortisation (Depn/Amort) minus operating cash flow (CFO); all scaled by 
beginning of year total assets. The second step is to estimate the normal current 
accruals (NCA), based on the industry parameter estimates α1, α2 and α3, as 
follows: 
 
1 2 3 1
1 1 1
1
α α α 
  
   
      
   
   
ijt ijt
 ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt
TCA REV
 ROA ε
A A A
  (2) 
 
where ∆REVijt = revenues in year t less revenues in year t–1 for firm i in industry 
j; ROAijt –1 = return on average assets in year t–1 for firm i in industry j; Aijt–1 = 
total assets at year t–1 for firm i in industry j. NCA is obtained as follows: 
 
   
 
  1 2 3 1
1 1
1
 
ijt ijt
ijt ijt
ijt ijt
REV REC
NCA est α est α est α ROA
A A

 
  
   
 
 
   (3) 
 
where ∆RECijt = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t–1 for firm i 
in industry j; and other variables are as previously defined. Finally, DCA is 
computed as follows: 
 
1 1
ijt ijt
ijt
ijt ijt
DCA TCA
NCA
A A 
    (4) 
 
The second DTA model that we employ in this paper is the modified Jones model 
as developed by Dechow et al. (1995), which is based on total accruals (TAC), 
measured as follows:  
 
TAC = EBXI – CFO  (5)  
 
Equation (6) derives the industry coefficients to estimate normal total accruals 
(NTA) as follows: 
 
1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1ijt ijt ijt
ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt
TAC REV PPE
 α  α  α
A A A A   
     
         
     
     
 (6) 
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where PPEijt is property, plant and equipment at end of year t for firm i in 
industry j and other variables are as previously defined. DTA is obtained by:  
 
     1 2 3
1 1 1 1 1
1
    
        
         
            
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
DTA TAC REV REC PPE
est α est α est α
A A A A A
  (7) 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Sample selection 
  
Our study examines earnings management in the period following the 
implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
2006. We believe discretionary accruals might be different in the period of pre- 
and post-IFRS due to lesser accounting choices allowed post-IFRS. To estimate 
the industry coefficients for the discretionary current accruals model, we employ 
financial data for the years 2008 and 2009. However, for the discretionary total 
accruals model, we estimate the industry coefficients employing financial data 
for the prior years 2007 and 2008, in line with the original Jones model (1991).  
Our tests on whether the hypotheses variables influence earnings management 
are based on the year 2009, i.e., the earliest period post-IFRS. This study utilises 
the sample of non-financial public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia in 2009. 
The number of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia at the end of June 2010 was 985 
firms. However, after eliminating companies listed on ACE Market and with 
missing data, only 525 Main Market companies are usable in this paper, as 
presented in Table 1.    
 
Table 1 
Sample selection criteria 
 
  Description Number 
1 Total companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia at June 2010 985 
2 Less companies in the ACE Market  133 
3 Less financial, insurance and investment companies  49 
4 Less companies where there are fewer than ten observations in any industry 30 
5 Less companies with missing Datastream information 153 
6 Less companies with missing audit firm tenure and auditor fee data 80 
7 Less companies with missing annual reports and changes of financial year end 15 
8 Final sample 525 
 
 
 
Hasan Mohammed Bamahros and Wan Nordin Wan-Hussin 
154 
Regression model    
 
To examine the effect of auditor characteristics on the absolute discretionary 
accruals, we fit ordinary least square (OLS) models as depicted below:  
 
DCA or DTA = α + β1LNNAS + β2TENURE + β3BIG4 + β4LNFEE + 
β5ACAUDP + β6ACSIZE + β7ACINDP + β8ACMEET + β9LNASSET + β10CFO 
+ β11SEGMENTP + β12SEGMENTG + β13FINANCE +  β14LOSS + β15MTB + 
β16LEVERAGE + β17ACC + β18SECTOR + ε                 (8)                                            
 
 The appendix describes each of the variables. The auditor and audit 
committee data are hand-collected from annual reports, whereas financial and 
product and geographical segments data are collected from DataStream. The 
annual reports are obtained from the Bursa Malaysia website 
(http://announcements.bursamalaysia.com). The Bursa sector is obtained from 
The Star newspaper. 
 
Our variables of interest are the two external audit characteristics, 
namely, magnitude of non-audit fees (LNNAS) and length of audit firm-client 
relationship (TENURE). Consistent with previous research, we also control for 
other auditor characteristics.  Researchers have presented extensive evidence that 
clients of Big Four audit firms have significantly lower discretionary accruals. 
Previous studies imply that the audit fees reflect the audit effort.  Frankel et al. 
(2002) and Gul, Jaggi and Krishnan (2007) present a negative relationship 
between audit fees and earnings management. We also include several audit 
committee characteristics, namely, audit committee expertise, audit committee 
size, audit committee independence and audit committee meetings. Audit 
committee members with prior experience in external auditing (ACAUDP) act as 
proxies for audit committee expertise. We expect a negative association between 
ACAUDP and discretionary accruals. Prior research also finds firms with poor 
corporate governance mechanisms, as reflected by fewer independent audit 
committee members (ACINDP), smaller audit committee size (ACSIZE) and less 
frequent audit committee meetings (ACMEET), have higher discretionary 
accruals.  
 
The remaining control variables are firm size, cash flow from operations, 
firm complexity, financing requirement, loss incidence, market-to-book ratio, 
leverage, absolute accruals and the Bursa sector that have been found by prior 
studies to be associated with the level of discretionary accruals. The natural 
logarithm of total assets (LNASSET), which acts a proxy for firm size, is 
expected to have systematically lower discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. 
(1995) and Becker et al. (1998) report a negative relationship between 
discretionary accruals and cash flow from operations (CFO). Previous research 
Non-Audit Fees, Audit Tenure and Earning Quality 
155 
has suggested that firm complexity (SEGMENTP and SEGMENTG) has a 
positive association with discretionary accruals.  
 
Previous studies have also documented that firms that raise equity or 
need additional financing (FINANCE) are more likely to engage in discretionary 
accruals than others. Earlier studies have suggested that loss making firms and 
firms with high market-to-book (MTB) ratio are more likely to use discretionary 
accruals. Given the conceptually and empirically ambiguous relationship between 
leverage and earnings management, we do not make any predictions on the 
expected sign for the leverage coefficient. One view is that firms that are 
constrained by interest-coverage debt covenants may resort to earnings 
management. Alternatively, rigorous monitoring by debt holders may discourage 
earnings management. The lagged absolute value of current or total accruals is 
employed to capture the effect of last year's accruals on discretionary accruals. 
Past studies have found lagged accruals to be associated with the level of 
discretionary accruals. As shown in the next section, firms operating in the 
properties sector have the lowest levels of DCA and DTA. Therefore, in this 
study, SECTOR is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is 
classified under the properties sector, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables utilised in this paper. 
The mean of absolute abnormal accruals is 0.06, which is similar to Johl et al. 
(2013) and Salleh et al. (2012). The mean (median) of non-audit fees in this study 
is RM94,180 (RM11,750). The mean of audit firm tenure is slightly more than 
six years. The percentage of companies audited by Big Four auditors in our 
sample is 61%, which is lower than that reported by Yunos, Ismail and Smith 
(2012; 65.5%) and Johl, Mat Zain and Subramaniam (2012; 68.5%). The mean 
(median) of audit fees in this sample is RM348,000 (RM132,000) and ranges 
from RM7,000 to RM20,800,000. This mean (median) is higher than the 
RM240,956 (RM115,500) reported by Johl, Mat Zain and Subramanian (2012).  
 
In terms of audit committee composition, the mean (median) size of the 
audit committee is 3.25 (3). Approximately 87% of the audit committee members 
are independent directors, which is higher than the 76% reported by Johl et al. 
(2012). All the sample companies comply with the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (Security Commision Malaysia, 2007) recommendation where none 
of the audit committees has less than 50% independent members. Interestingly, 
26% of the audit committee members in our sample have prior external auditing 
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experience. Nearly two-thirds of the audit committees conduct more than four 
meetings per year, which is similar to Yusof (2010), Johl et al. (2012), Yunos, 
Ismail and Smith (2012) and Salleh et al. (2012).   
 
As for firm size, the mean (median) of total assets is RM1,664 million  
(RM355 million); this ranges from as small as RM30 million to as large as RM71 
billion, and the average is higher than the RM1,410 million reported by Johl et al. 
(2012). Firm size is right skewed, and we perform natural logarithmic 
transformation to normalise it for multivariate analysis. The mean (median) cash 
flow from operations divided by total assets last year (CFO) is 7.5% (7.2%). The 
mean of CFO is larger than Abdul Rahman and Ali’s (2006) study. The sample 
companies have, on average, three product segments and more than two 
geographical segments. During the sample period, 10.4% of the firms had 
significant new financing. Approximately 24% of the sample companies incurred 
losses in 2009, similar to that reported by Johl et al. (2012; 28%).  The mean 
(median) of MTB ratio in this study is 0.982 (0.650), comparable to the figures of 
1.055 (0.836) reported by Yunos et al. (2012).  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
DCA  0.06 0.04 0 1.02 0.09 
DTA  0.06 0.04 0 1.04 0.09 
NAS (RM’000) 94.18 11.75 0 6600 399 
TENURE 6.43 8.00 1.00 8.00 2.37 
BIG4 0.61 1.00 0 1.00 0.49 
FEE (RM’000) 348 132 7.00 20800 1061 
ACAUDP 0.26 0.33 0 1.00 0.21 
ACSIZE 3.25 3.00 2.00 6.00 0.51 
ACINDP 0.87 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.15 
ACMEET 4.98 5.00 1.00 15.00 1.36 
ASSET (RM million) 1664 355 30 71363 5489 
CFO 0.08 0.07 –0.97 0.61 0.11 
SEGMENTG 2.25 1.00 1.00 10.00 1.92 
FINANCE 0.10 0 0 1.00 0.31 
LOSS 0.24 0 0 1.00 0.43 
MTB 0.98 0.65 –5.76 27.82 1.68 
LEVERAGE 0.21 0.20 0 0.85 0.17 
ACC – DCA model 0.06 0.04 0 0.43 0.06 
SEGMENTP 2.92 3.00 1.00 8.00 1.54 
ACC – DTA model 0.06 0.05 0 0.55 0.07 
SECTOR 0.07 0 0 1.00 0.26 
 
N= 525. NAS is non-audit fees paid to incumbent auditor, FEE is statutory audit fees paid to incumbent auditor, 
ASSET is total assets, and other variables are defined in Appendix.  
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Univariate 
 
Table 3 demonstrates that the highest correlation coefficient is between 
LNASSET and LNFEE (0.78), which is expected as auditors charge higher fees 
for larger clients.  Multicollinearity is not perceived as a serious threat as the 
correlations among other variables do not exceed 0.55, and Pedhazur (1997) 
argues that collinearity under 0.80 is acceptable. As for the Pearson correlations 
between the independent variables and discretionary accruals, the results 
demonstrate that there is a positive correlation (albeit insignificant) between NAS 
and both DCA and DTA. TENURE is significantly and negatively related to both 
DCA and DTA.  
 
Multivariate  
 
Table 4 presents the main results of the OLS regressions that examine the effects 
of auditor characteristics on discretionary accruals based on White's (1980) 
standard error corrected for heteroscedasticity. The discretionary accruals models 
that we employ in this study have a good fit with adjusted R2 = 25%, comparable 
to the Malaysian study by Saleh et al. (2005) and the US study by Ashbaugh et 
al. (2003), and considerably higher than Johl et al. (2013, adjusted R2 = 17%).  
 
 The variable, LNNAS, has a significant positive relationship with DCA 
and DTA. This implies that firms that purchase a higher NAS from the auditor 
report higher discretionary accruals. Our results support the stream of research 
that argues that non-audit fees can impair auditor independence, such as 
Ferguson et al. (2004) and Basioudis, Papanastasiou and Geiger  (2008) in the 
UK, Frankel et al. (2002) and Larcker and Richardson (2004) in the US and 
Sharma et al. (2011) in New Zealand. Thus, our results are at odds with Abdul 
Wahab et al. (2014), who argue that NAS provide a knowledge spillover benefit 
that enhances audit and financial reporting quality in Malaysia. However, they 
limit their empirical test to the association between the magnitude of the NAS 
and financial reporting quality for companies that purchase NAS, whereas our 
sample includes both purchasers and non-purchasers of NAS. One of the 
implications of our research is that regulators should be concerned with the 
possibility that the provision of NAS by an incumbent auditor may impair the 
auditor's independence.   
 
The audit firm tenure is negatively associated with DCA and DTA. This 
indicates that companies that engage with the auditor for a long time tend to have 
lower discretionary accruals. Our finding that firms with shorter tenures are more 
likely to report higher absolute discretionary accruals than those with longer 
tenures suggests that long audit firm tenure increases the quality of the financial 
statements. This is consistent with the notion that the long auditor-client 
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relationship enables the auditor to increase their client-specific knowledge. As 
the auditor becomes specialised with the client, the auditor's bargaining power 
increases, thus enabling it to resist management demands to present firm 
performance in a better light by manipulating discretionary accruals.  
 
Table 4 
Main regression results on non-audit fees, audit firm tenure and discretionary accruals 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
DCA DTA 
Coeff. t-statistics Prob.  
(2-tailed) 
Coeff. t-statistics Prob.  
(2-tailed) 
LNNAS ? 0.005 2.61 0.009 0.004 2.17 0.030 
TENURE – –0.003 –1.87 0.062 –0.004 –2.28 0.023 
BIG4 – –0.003 –0.37 0.709 0.002 0.23 0.815 
LNFEE – –0.007 –1.08 0.282 –0.011 –1.63 0.105 
ACAUDP – –0.051 –3.04 0.003 –0.047 –2.71 0.007 
ACSIZE – 0.005 0.76 0.447 0.000 0.07 0.941 
ACINDP – 0.039 1.75 0.081 0.013 0.54 0.588 
ACMEET – –0.002 –0.40 0.687 –0.002 –0.32 0.747 
LNASSET – –0.008 –1.65 0.100 –0.006 –1.22 0.222 
CFO – –0.262 –1.86 0.063 –0.296 –2.07 0.039 
SEGMENTP + 0.003 1.50 0.134 0.003 1.45 0.148 
SEGMENTG + 0.006 2.44 0.015 0.007 2.51 0.012 
FINANCE + 0.017 1.21 0.226 0.028 1.85 0.065 
LOSS + 0.049 2.88 0.004 0.050 2.82 0.005 
MTB + 0.009 2.64 0.009 0.010 2.73 0.007 
LEVERAGE ? –0.028 –1.01 0.315 –0.020 –0.71 0.480 
ACC + 0.131 1.82 0.069 0.037 0.58 0.561 
SECTOR – –0.037 –4.19 0.000 –0.036 –3.87 0.000 
Constant  0.160 3.31 0.001 0.194 4.02 0.000 
R-Squared   0.27   0.27  
Adjusted R-
squared 
 
 0.25   0.25  
F Value   4.67   2.98  
Sig F   0.000   0.000  
 
N = 525. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Our study fails to find a significant relationship between the Big Four 
auditors and discretionary accruals in all the models. This is in line with previous 
Malaysian studies by Abdul Jalil and Abdul Rahman (2010), Yusof (2010) and 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006). The multivariate analysis finds that audit 
committee auditing expertise mitigates discretionary accruals. Thus, having more 
audit committee members with external auditing experience is advantageous in 
terms of reducing accruals-based earnings management. Our study suggests that 
there is a higher tendency for accruals manipulation among highly complex firms 
with more geographical segments, loss-making firms and firms with higher MTB 
ratios.  
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SUPPLEMENTARY TESTS 
 
Following Gul et al. (2007), Sharma et al. (2011) and Knechel, Sharma and 
Sharma (2012), this study repeats the regression analysis utilising non-audit fee 
ratios (non-audit fees divided by total auditor fees) in place of a natural logarithm 
of non-audit fees. The results of the alternative measurement of this variable are 
presented in Table 5. The non-audit fee ratio is positively significant in both the 
DCA and DTA models, and TENURE remains significant. 
 
Table 5 
Supplementary regression results using different proxy for non-audit fees 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
DCA DTA 
Coeff. t-statistics 
Prob. 
(2-tailed) 
Coeff. t-statistics 
Prob. 
(2-tailed) 
PCTNAS ? 0.048 2.32 0.021 0.045 2.14 0.033 
TENURE – –0.003 –1.91 0.056 –0.004 –2.35 0.019 
BIG4 – –0.003 –0.34 0.732 0.002 0.20 0.842 
LNFEE – –0.005 –0.69 0.491 –0.009 –1.26 0.210 
ACAUDP – –0.050 –2.98 0.003 –0.045 –2.67 0.008 
ACSIZE – 0.006 0.81 0.416 0.001 0.11 0.912 
ACINDP – 0.038 1.73 0.083 0.013 0.54 0.591 
ACMEET – –0.002 –0.29 0.774 –0.002 –0.24 0.807 
LNASSET – –0.008 –1.56 0.120 –0.006 –1.19 0.237 
CFO – –0.259 –1.85 0.065 –0.293 –2.05 0.041 
SEGMENTP + 0.003 1.51 0.132 0.003 1.43 0.152 
SEGMENTG + 0.006 2.48 0.013 0.007 2.53 0.012 
FINANCE + 0.016 1.23 0.218 0.027 1.88 0.060 
LOSS + 0.049 2.89 0.004 0.050 2.84 0.005 
MTB + 0.009 2.65 0.008 0.010 2.74 0.006 
LEVERAGE ? –0.028 –1.03 0.303 –0.021 –0.74 0.463 
ACC + 0.136 1.90 0.057 0.042 0.66 0.507 
SECTOR – –0.036 –4.14 0.000 –0.035 –3.82 0.000 
Constant  0.137 3.06 0.002 0.176 3.91 0.000 
R-Squared   0.28   0.28  
Adjusted R-squared   0.25   0.25  
F-Value   4.30   2.77  
Sig. F   0.000   0.000  
 
N = 525. PCTNAS is non-audit fees divided by total auditor fees, and other variables are defined in Appendix. 
 
We also conduct further tests to allay the concern that there is a potential 
endogeneity threat in our model. For example, earnings management and NAS 
may be jointly determined, i.e., a Big Four accounting firm affects NAS, and it 
also affects earnings management. Similarly, audit firm tenure and earnings 
management may be jointly determined by the Big Four accounting firm. To 
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resolve this concern, we rerun the model by removing the BIG4 variable and find 
that the main results hold, as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Supplementary regression results by excluding BIG4 variable 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
DCA DTA 
Coeff. t-statistics 
Prob. 
(2-tailed) 
Coeff. t-statistics 
Prob. 
(2-tailed) 
LNNAS ? 0.005 2.64 0.008 0.004 2.29 0.023 
TENURE – –0.003 –2.28 0.023 –0.004 –2.43 0.015 
LNFEE – –0.008 –1.15 0.250 –0.011 –1.65 0.100 
ACAUDP – –0.052 –3.05 0.002 –0.046 –2.68 0.008 
ACSIZE – 0.005 0.74 0.459 0.001 0.10 0.924 
ACINDP – 0.039 1.80 0.073 0.012 0.53 0.596 
ACMEET – –0.002 –0.36 0.720 –0.002 –0.35 0.726 
LNASSET – –0.008 –1.65 0.100 –0.006 –1.20 0.231 
CFO – –0.263 –1.88 0.061 –0.296 –2.07 0.039 
SEGMENTP + 0.004 1.55 0.121 0.003 1.43 0.152 
SEGMENTG + 0.006 2.48 0.013 0.006 2.51 0.013 
FINANCE + 0.017 1.23 0.218 0.027 1.83 0.068 
LOSS + 0.049 2.88 0.004 0.050 2.82 0.005 
MTB + 0.009 2.64 0.008 0.010 2.73 0.007 
LEVERAGE ? –0.027 –0.97 0.334 –0.020 –0.73 0.468 
ACC + 0.130 1.81 0.071 0.038 0.59 0.554 
SECTOR – –0.037 –4.32 0.000 –0.036 –3.95 0.000 
Constant  0.161 3.33 0.001 0.193 3.96 0.000 
R-Squared   0.27   0.27  
Adjusted R-squared   0.26   0.26  
F-Value   4.62   2.92  
Sig. F   0.000   0.000  
 
N = 525. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since the pioneering work on the effect of auditor-provided NAS on the quality 
of financial reporting by Frankel et al. (2002) and DeFond, Raghunandan and 
Subramanyam (2002), the debate on whether the provision of NAS by the 
incumbent external auditor compromises the auditor's independence persists until 
today. Similarly, the issue of whether the audit firm should be subjected to 
mandatory rotation continues to be an enduring topic of public debate. We 
examine the association of NAS and audit firm tenure with earnings management 
in 525 Malaysian listed firms for the year 2009. We find that audit firm tenure is 
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negatively related to the absolute value of discretionary accruals, and the 
magnitude of NAS fees is positively related to the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals.  
  
The results in this study provide evidence that suggests that joint 
provision of NAS could impair the independence of the auditor, consistent with 
the economic bonding argument. It contradicts Abdul Wahab et al. (2014), who 
find the types and recurring nature of NAS do not impair auditor independence. 
Instead, they show that firms that purchase more NAS have a lower likelihood of 
financial restatements. To create more clarity and help Malaysian regulators and 
audit committees resolve the issue of whether to restrict the provision of NAS, in 
line with the current regulation in the US, further research on NAS employing 
more recent and detailed data is needed. In tandem with Shafie et al. (2009) and 
Wan-Hussin and Bamahros (2013), this study finds that extended audit firm 
tenure is not detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. Thus, based on the 
empirical evidence to date, an attempt to legislate audit firm rotation in Malaysia 
is unwarranted.  
 
One of the limitations of this study is that it examines only one aspect of 
the duration of the auditor-client relationship, namely, the audit firm tenure. We 
do not assess the efficacy of the mandatory adoption of the five-year rotation 
cycle for the audit partner and leave this for future research. Future studies may 
also consider other potential determinants of earnings management, such as types 
and recurrence of NAS, client's promise of future NAS, and institutional investor 
ownership. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Measurement 
 
DCA Absolute discretionary current accruals obtained from the performance-adjusted 
model developed by Ashbaugh et al. (2003). See equation (4) 
DTA Absolute discretionary total accruals obtained from the modified-Jones model 
(1995). See equation (7) 
LNNAS Natural logarithm of (1 + non-audit fees) 
TENURE Number of continuous years the incumbent auditor has been with the client 
since 2002 (or date of listing if later than 2002) until 2009. (Note: If the audit 
firms are involved in mergers and changed their names as a result, we treat it as 
no audit firm rotation. For example the auditors for Eng Kah Corporation were 
JB Lau & Associates (2002) and Grant Thornton (2009) and since JB Lau & 
Associates has merged with Grant Thornton since 1 January 2008, we measure 
the audit firm tenure for Eng Kah Corporation as eight years) 
BIG4 Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm was audited by PwC, KPMG, Ernst & 
Young and Deloitte, and 0 otherwise 
LNFEE Natural logarithm of audit fees 
ACAUDP Proportion of audit committee members who have external auditing experience 
ACINDP Proportion of the independent directors on the audit committee 
ACSIZE Number of directors serving on the audit committee  
ACMEET Number of audit committee meetings held during the fiscal year 
LNASSET Natural logarithm of total assets 
CFO Cash flow from operation scaled by lagged total assets 
SEGMENTP Number of product segments 
SEGMENTG Number of geographical segments 
FINANCE Dummy variable equals 1 if the number of outstanding shares increased by at 
least 10% or long-term debt increased by at least 20% during the year, and 0 
otherwise, 
LOSS Dummy variable equals 1 if ROA is negative, and 0 otherwise 
MTB Market-to-book ratio 
LEVERAGE Total debt divided by total assets  
ACC Last year's absolute current accruals equal to net income before extraordinary 
items plus depreciation and amortisation minus operating cash flows scaled by 
beginning of year total assets (for DCA model) or, last year’s absolute total 
accruals equal to net income before extraordinary items minus operating cash 
flows scaled by beginning of year total assets (for DTA model) 
SECTOR Dummy variable equals 1 if firm is classified under properties sector, and 0 
otherwise 
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